An Economic Theory of Democracy

The necessity to make these choices, as well as the choices made by individual voters, threesome to states of inequality among the members of a antiauthoritarian society. According to Downs (1957), those members of a democratic society with access to the resources to acquire more teaching who also make the decision to acquire more information deal greater political influence within the society. Downs (1957) also con beed that batch tend to make decisions to vote in part of the nucleotide of the benefits (returns) they will receive from voting.

These returns must exceed to cost of acquiring the information necessary to

Because they give birth access to the resources necessary to defer the costs of acquiring information and because of the perceived returns from voting available to them by voting for a particular political party, however, higher(prenominal) income voters in democracy tend to participate in voting at a higher frequency than is true of lower income voters. The cost of information creates a condition of dubiety, and according to Downs (1957) as long as uncertainty exists, "perfect political quality is irrational" (p. 258).

Downs (1957) concluded that in situations wherein "voting is costless, any return whatsoever makes abstention irrational, so everyone who has even a slight party preference votes" (p. 273). The synthesis of this conclusion in relation to voting patterns in
Ordercustompaper.com is a professional essay writing service at which you can buy essays on any topics and disciplines! All custom essays are written by professional writers!