Critically Discuss Standing in Actions for Annulment and the Dissertation

Critically Discuss Standing in Actions for Annulment and the Development of Legal Protection in EU Courts - Article 263-267 Trea - Dissertation Example The analysis this paper presents does not imply a conclusive rejoinder to the debate on standing under Article 263 TFEU. Rather, it attempts to approach the discussion through a different angle. Chapter 3: Direct Concern Technically, the narrow and restrictive approach to direct concern by the Court of Justice limits the success of the applicants. Additionally, if the applicant can show that the measure of personal concern, they are still required to demonstrate that the decision is of direct concern. For instance, the applicant can only establish direct concern in relation to a measure if it was maintained by ECJ that the measure directly affects the applicant’s legal situation and discloses its addressees charged with the task of implementing it. Other restrictions include, even though the applicant can establish direct concern, it must be dependent on whether the action that affects the applicant was with discretion of the Member State (Usher, 2005). On the other hand, citi zens can only challenge decisions that are only addressed to them, and even though addressed to them, it must have a direct impact on them. The Court of Justice views this to be the case if a person is clearly affected in a distinct way in a way that affects him with the UE undertakings or other individuals. Ultimately, it can be argued that the Member States may face a major barrier from their role of taking all suitable measures to ensure the fulfillment of the objectives or obligations of the EU as they face major opposition from the citizens who perceive the union as being â€Å"super-state† and inaccessible. The restrictive nature inhibits the Member States from facilitating the achievement of the Union’s objectives (Abaquense de Parfouru, 2007). Firstly, the interested parties cannot start direction actions by any interested party other than the EU institutions or member states in pending cases before the Court of Justice as such. This is discernible through a pr ocedure where only that party that can demonstrate direct or indirect interest that determine the outcome of the case. In this case, the intervener is restricted from supporting the conclusions of one of the parties, and in that case cannot raise new ground to on which either of the parties has used. This recalls the case in Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v. Commission, where Fisherman, farmers and environmental groups wished to challenge a decision by the commission, to grant financial assistance to the European Regional Development Fund, to construct new power stations on the Canary Islands. Stichting Greenpeace illustrates that even those who may suffer from hazards resulting from an activity will not have standing if the activity poses a threat to an entire population rather than specific parts of it. A similar conclusion was reached in Danielson concerning the equivalent of Article 263 in Euratom. Initially, where the application an abstract terminology test found that the measure used was without doubt a regulation, the court would stop the proceedings then. However, in current jurisprudence, it appears the European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ) is showing willingness to recognize that some regulations have the potential to cause direct and individual concern. Accordingly, a plaintiff must have enough locus standi to take legal action. Such as in the case of Codorniu SA V Council (Case: C-309/89 [1994] ECR